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Corruption, Income Inequality, and Subsequent Economic Growth
Abstract
This paper attempts to untangle the link between corruption and income inequality with subsequent
economic growth. It uses standard OLS multiple regression analysis and data from 134 countries over a
ten year time frame to test the hypothesis that after controlling for corruption, income inequality will be
less significant in explaining subsequent growth rates. Perhaps it is not income equality that fosters
economic growth, but rather a decrease in corruption that causes both economic growth and greater
equality. This study yields some expected findings in support of well-established variables and concludes
that inequality harms growth even after controlling for corruption.
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I. Introduction
What makes some countries rich but others poor? This is a question as old
as economics itself, dating back to Adam Smith’s 1776 magnum opus, An Inquiry
into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations. However, despite the
question’s age and importance, it is still relatively open. Prior research has
established causal relationships in a large number of different variables; Durlauf
et al. (2005) identify 145 different variables found to be statistically significant
for impacting growth in at least one study. Among the most consistent factors
positively impacting growth are level of investment, sound money, and openness
to trade (Levine and Renelt 1992). Yet, with many African and Latin American
countries still lagging behind, more recent research has focused on the effect of
social cohesion on economic growth. This strand of research examines the effects
of ethnic diversity, sharing a common language, and especially income inequality1
on economic growth. Greater income inequality was first thought to positively
influence economic growth. Arthur Okun argued in his influential 1975 book,
Equality and Efficiency: The Big Tradeoff, that income equality is fostered by
redistributive policies that harm growth2 (“leaky bucket” analogy). This
conventional textbook approach posits that income inequality is the result of
healthy incentives, and thus, inequality is good for growth. However, the
majority of subsequent research finds a negative relationship between income
inequality and subsequent economic growth (Alesina and Rodrik 1994; Persson
and Tabellini 1994; Perotti 1996; Rodrik 1999; Easterly et al. 2006; Berg et al.
2012).
Corruption is another variable consistently found to negatively impact
growth (Mauro 1995; Mauro 1997; Tanzi 1998; Wei 2000). The literature on how
corruption impacts growth and how inequality impacts growth has developed
largely independently. However, since corruption is positively correlated with
inequality (Gupta et al. 2002; Brempong 2002; Brempong and Camacho 2006)
and negatively correlated with growth (Mauro 1995; Mauro 1997; Tanzi 1998;
Wei 2000), the effects of income inequality and corruption on subsequent growth
may not be fully understood independent of one another. Studies that examine the
effects of income inequality on subsequent growth but fail to account for
corruption may suffer from omitted variable bias. After controlling for
corruption, income inequality may not influence economic growth as much as
previous studies have found.

1

Kuznets (1955) was the first to examine the relationship between economic growth and income
inequality. However, Kuznets (1955) focuses on how economic growth impacts income
inequality while this paper examines how income inequality impacts subsequent economic
growth.
2
Despite the trade-off that Okun identified, he nonetheless supported redistributive policies.
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The purpose of this research is to bridge the gap between income
inequality and corruption studies by analyzing both variables within the same
model. My hypothesis is that after controlling for corruption, income inequality
will be less significant in explaining subsequent growth rates across countries3.
Perhaps it is not income equality that brings about economic growth but rather a
decrease in corruption that causes both economic growth and greater income
equality.
This study is organized as follows. Section II provides a summary of the
literature on inequality and economic growth as well as corruption and economic
growth. Section III details the data used and statistical techniques performed.
Section IV discloses the findings of this study followed by key observations.
Section V concludes with an interpretation of the findings, policy implications,
and recommendations for future work.
II. Literature Review
Although one of the oldest areas in economic research, development
economics still has many questions left unanswered or only partially answered.
There have been a wide range of studies examining the determinants of economic
growth using a variety of explanatory variables, control variables, and statistical
techniques. A common problem throughout this broad body of literature is the
difficulty in performing empirical analysis. The difficulty is brought about by
poor data, small sample sizes, omitted variable bias, and endogeneity. Poor
countries, especially those with corrupt governments, often do not have reliable
data. Additionally, surveys attempting to measure the same variable may vary
greatly across different countries (Deininger and Squire 1996). With small
sample sizes and 145 variables found statistically significant for impacting growth
(Durlauf et al. 2005), there is bound to be omitted variable bias. With the number
of explanatory variables approaching the total number of countries in the world,
no model could include anywhere close to all of the important variables. Even in
models that account for several important variables, there is still the problem of
endogeneity. Many variables in the development literature both influence
economic growth and are influenced by it4. Despite the difficulties with empirical
work, some variables, such as income inequality and corruption, have been
consistent across a wide variety of studies.
3

In statistical terms, if corruption is omitted from the growth model, this may generate a negative
bias on the estimated income inequality coefficient. The coefficient on income inequality may
appear more negative when corruption is excluded from the model.
4
For example, lower levels of corruption may foster growth, but growth may also cause
corruption to decrease. Additionally, the level of income inequality may impact growth, but
growth may also impact income inequality (Kuznets 1955). These problems will be addressed
more thoroughly in the methodology section.
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Studies examining how initial inequality5 impacts economic growth differ
in both their methodology and their conclusions. Inequality is theorized to impact
growth through three main channels: redistribution, weaker institutions handling
external shocks6 poorly, and credit market imperfections. Sachs (1989) theorizes
that high income inequality in Latin American countries led to political pressure
for redistributive policies to raise the incomes of lower income groups. These
attempts at redistribution contribute to poor policy and thus weaker economic
performance. Unlike Sachs (1989), Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and
Tabellini (1994) develop formal models based on the median voter theory, and
then test their models empirically. Both models start with the assumption that
people with more capital prefer lower tax rates since those with capital own the
means of production and benefit from economic growth that is fostered from low
tax rates. However, those with labor income prefer higher taxes as some of the
tax revenue is redistributed from capital owners to those with labor income. A
pure capitalist prefers a tax rate that maximizes growth while those with labor
income prefer a tax rate that exceeds the ideal tax rate for growth. Inequality is
defined by how poor the median voter is compared to the average voter. Thus, a
more equitable distribution means more capital for the median voter. With more
capital, the median voter selects a lower tax rate that in turn promotes more
growth. Both Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini (1994)
substantiate their theories by showing that initial inequality is negatively and
significantly correlated with growth in a subsequent period. However, neither
performs a statistical test to determine whether the specific channel of
redistribution is how inequality impacts growth.
Weak institutions functioning poorly after an external shock is another
channel through which income inequality is theorized to negatively impact
subsequent economic growth. Rodrik (1999) builds a model where two groups
battle for resources after an external shock. The two groups are less likely to
cooperate when they cannot agree on what a “fair” distribution is and also when
they have more to gain from excluding the other group. Determining a “fair”
distribution is more difficult when latent social conflict, of which income
inequality is a factor, is high. Excluding the other group is more profitable if the
society’s institutions are weak (De Soto 2003). Thus, Rodrik (1999) concludes
that inequality harms growth by weakening political institutions. Using threestage least squares Easterly et al. (2006) find that all their measures for
institutional quality are positively correlated to growth and related to both of their
5

In order to avoid reverse-causation (growth impacting inequality) researchers have used
inequality at the start of a period to see how it influences subsequent growth in the next 5 or even
up to 50 years.
6
External shocks include a wide variety of factors such as natural disasters and changes in a
country’s terms of trade.
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measures for social cohesion7. They conclude that societies with lower initial
income inequality have more social cohesion and thus better institutions.
According to Easterly et al. (2006), countries with solid institutions have longer
growth spurts due to better handling of external shocks. The conclusions of
Rodrik (1999) and Easterly et al. (2006) are supported by Berg et al. (2012) who
find that external shocks are associated with a higher risk of a growth spell
ending.
Credit-market imperfections are another avenue through which inequality
is theorized to retard growth. Benabou (1996) contends that credit constraints
prevent the poor from investing the optimal amount. Since there are decreasing
returns to capital investments, redistributing from the rich (whose marginal
productivity from investment is relatively low) to the poor (whose marginal
productivity from investment is relatively high) may enhance productivity and
economic growth (Benabou 1996). Aghion et al. (1999) examine more closely
the incentives of poor borrowers and conclude that inequality also decreases
borrowers’ incentives. With limited liability, a poor borrower may suffer from a
moral hazard problem. Since the borrower is poor, there is little for them to lose
if the loan cannot be repaid. A borrower with a lower level of initial wealth will
be less motivated to ensure the success of the project compared to a borrower with
a higher level of initial wealth (Aghion et al. 1999). Barro (2000) supports the
credit-market imperfections theory by finding that the effects of inequality on
growth are negative for poor countries (GDP per capita below $2070) but positive
for wealthier countries (GDP per capita above $2070). Since credit-market
imperfections are more serious in developing countries, greater inequality harms
growth more in poor countries (Barro 2000; Keefer and Knack 2002).
Although the majority of research has found a negative relationship
between initial income inequality and subsequent economic growth, Banerjee and
Duflo (2003) find that any change in inequality is associated with a decrease in
subsequent growth. They contend that their findings are consistent with the
theory that redistribution in either direction is costly due to social upheaval.
However, this theory is given as an explanation to their empirical findings and is
never tested empirically. Additionally, Banerjee and Duflo (2003) look at 5 and
10 year time intervals, while most other research uses longer time intervals of 15
to 50 years. Forbes (2000), in contrast to most other studies, finds a positive
relationship between income inequality and subsequent growth. A 10-point
increase in a country’s Gini coefficient is correlated with a 1.3% increase in
average annual growth over the subsequent 5 year period. However, Forbes
7

Easterly et al. (2006) use both the Gini coefficient as well as the share of income going to the
middle 60% as proxies for income distribution. Another measure for social cohesion they use is
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, or the probability that two randomly selected people will not
belong to the same ethnolinguistic group.
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(2000) uses a sample with half OECD countries and no countries are from subSaharan Africa. She acknowledges that her sample is disproportionally wealthy,
but contrary to Barro (2000), she finds no difference after separating rich and poor
countries. Forbes (2000) tentatively supports the theory that there is a trade-off
between reducing inequality and promoting growth.
Corruption awareness is growing and along with it there has been an
increased interest in the causes and consequences of corruption (Tanzi 1998).
However, corruption8 by its very nature is not an easy subject to study.
Corruption can be difficult to quantify because corrupt acts are almost always
done secretly. Thus, the most common type of proxies used for corruption are
subjective indices of how corrupt people think their government is. Despite the
challenges, there is a growing body of literature examining the effects of
corruption on subsequent growth. Although the studies have unanimously found
that corruption harms growth, they differ in how corruption harms growth. Four
main channels have been proposed for how corruption harms growth: it alters how
government spends money, harms investments, distorts incentives, and increases
political instability.
Corruption affects the composition of government expenditure because
corrupt government officials may prefer expenditure that makes it easier to collect
bribes (Mauro 1997). Expenditures on grand projects, such as large-scale
infrastructure, with market values that are difficult to determine, may attract
corruption. In health spending, there may be more opportunities for corruption in
the procurement of hospital buildings and state-of-the-art medical equipment, but
less opportunity in salaries of doctors and nurses (Mauro 1997). Using standard
OLS multiple regression as well as two-stage least squares, Mauro (1997) finds
that corruption does not impact the overall level of government spending;
however, it does reduce the amount of spending on education9. In altering the
composition of government expenditures, corruption negatively impacts
bureaucratic efficiency; a corrupt bureaucracy may award service contracts to less
efficient firms (Jain 2001).
Corruption harms investments both internally and externally. Using both
OLS and two-stage least squares, Mauro (1995) finds that a one standard
deviation improvement in corruption increases the investment rate by 4.75% of
GDP. This in turn contributes to increasing the annual growth rate by .8
percentage points. Besides discouraging investment from internal sources,
8

Corruption has been defined in several ways. However, the most widely used and simplest
definition is the abuse of public power for private benefit (Jain 2001). Although the corruption
literature and rent-seeking literature have developed independently, corruption is a form of rentseeking.
9
This in turn may reduce growth because educational attainment has been shown to be positively
correlated with growth (Levine and Renelt 1992; Benabou 1996; Barro 2000).
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corruption also reduces investment from foreigners. Wei (2000) finds that a onegrade increase in corruption reduces foreign direct investment by 16%. With a
large deviation in the level of corruption among countries, there can be a large
difference in foreign direct investment due to corruption level. Wei (2000)
demonstrates that an increase in the corruption level from that of Singapore
(which is one of the least corrupt countries) to that of Mexico (which is a highly
corrupt country) has an equivalent effect on reducing investment as increasing the
tax rate by 24 percentage points. Investment is one of the traditional factors
within the development literature shown to positively impact growth, but
corruption harms investments.
Corruption also harms growth by distorting incentives. Murphy et al.
(1993) theorizes that corruption, or more broadly rent-seeking, harms innovators
because new businesses usually require more import quotas, permits, licenses, and
other government-supplied “goods”. Established firms require fewer government
goods, are likely to be better connected with government officials, and also have
fewer credit-constraints (Murphy et al. 1993). Thus, established firms are less
likely to need to bribe public officials and can do so more easily when needed.
The negative impact of corruption on new businesses can undermine the
incentives for entrepreneurs in the long-run. Corruption over time can lead to
entrepreneurial talent leaving the productive sector and entering the rent-seeking
sector (Jain 2001).
Another vein through which corruption is thought to negatively impact
growth is political instability. Mo (2001) finds that a 1% increase in the
corruption level reduces the growth rate by .72% with the most important channel
being political instability. In his statistical analysis, political instability accounts
for 53% of the total effect. Mo (2001) reasons that corruption brings about
political instability that in turn creates uncertainty over the protection of property
rights. Uncertainty concerning property rights then reduces investment and
economic growth. However, Wei (2000) points out that corruption and political
instability causation could run both ways. Corruption may lead to public
discontent that eventually topples a government; however, unstable political
environments may cause officials to have short-term thinking and grab whatever
rents while they still can (Wei 2000).
Corruption and income inequality are both thought to influence growth.
Most of the literature has developed separately. However, a few studies do
mention both income inequality and corruption (Li et al. 2000, Gupta et al. 2002,
Brempong 2002, Brempong and Camacho 2006). These studies all find that
corruption increases income inequality and conclude that income inequality is
another channel through which corruption harms growth. These studies all
assume that income inequality harms growth. Only Forbes (2000) mentions that
controlling for corruption may alter the results of studies examining whether
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income inequality harms growth. However, Forbes (2000) performs no such
statistical test.
This paper contributes to the literature by bridging the gap between the
separate corruption and income inequality studies. To the best of my knowledge,
this is the first study to include corruption and income inequality within the same
model. Thus, I am able to determine whether income inequality on its own
influences subsequent economic growth, or if income inequality only appears to
influence subsequent economic growth because corruption impacts both income
inequality and economic growth.
III. Methodology
The country is my unit of analysis as I examine between 55 and 126
countries depending on the model. The World Bank (http://data.worldbank.org/)
is the primary data source since it is the data source for all variables except
corruption.
Data for corruption come from Transparency International’s
Corruption Perception Index (CPI) (http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/).
Table 1 displays bivariate correlations as well as means and standard deviations
for the sample of 55 countries.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015

7

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Table 1: Correlation Coefficients and Descriptive Statistics10
GR

GR
COR
GINI
y02
INV
OPEN
POPG
GOV
INF
HUM
AN
Mean
SD
n=55

COR

GINI

y02

INV

OPEN

POPG

GOV

INF

HUMAN

1.00
.386 1.00
-.10

.41

1.00

-.46

-.84

-.29

1.00

.52

.13

-.28

-.12

.33

-.01

-.31

.05

.49

1.00

-.28

.25

.53

-.34

-.31

-.46

1.00

-.15

-.58

-.38

.47

-.17

.17

-.32

1.00

.19

.24

.02

-.21

-.05

.04

-.10

-.05

1.00

.21

-.36

-.16

.52

.13

.27

-.59

.33

.24

1.00

3.19 5.82
2.27 2.13

45.7
8.48

3.42
.64

21.4
4.33

39.48
16.29

.98
1.17

15.3
5.18

6.91
9.62

91.42
18.51

1.00

The bivariate correlations reveal some expected findings as well as
potential problems. As expected, there is a relatively strong bivariate correlation
of .408 between corruption and income inequality. There is also a positive
bivariate correlation between corruption and growth. One explanation for this
surprising finding is that corruption has a bivariate correlation of -.841 with initial
level of income11 which has a bivariate correlation with growth of -.463. These

10

GR, average GDP per capita growth from 2002-2012; COR, the Corruption Perception Index;
GINI, the level of income inequality; y02, logged GDP per capita; INV, gross capital formation as
percentage of GDP; OPEN, imports of goods and services as percentage of GDP; POPG,
population growth as an annual percent; GOV, government spending as percentage of GDP; INF,
inflation rate; HUMAN, primary education completion rate.
11
The strong bivariate correlation between corruption and initial level of income introduces
multicollinearity into the model. This can make it difficult to distinguish the independent effect of
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findings suggest that corrupt countries tend to be poor and poor countries grew
faster over the time period. Thus, the negative effect of corruption on growth can
only be understood by controlling for independent effects through multiple
regression analysis.
The dependent variable is the average growth of real GDP per Capita12
from 2002-2012. This variable is not normally distributed since it has a skewness
of 3.615, which is well above the cut-off of 3. Having normally distributed
variables, especially the dependent variable, is one of the assumptions of standard
OLS multiple regression analysis. In order to normalize the dependent variable, I
take the logarithm13 of it. Thus, I display the results with both GDP per Capita
growth as well as the logged GDP per Capita growth.
Data limitations are another challenge of this study. In the full model, I
include a total of 10 variables while only having 55 observations. This is a
violation of a rule of thumb that suggests a minimum number of cases equal to 50
plus 8 times the number of variables used (Tabachnick and Fidell 2001). This
rule of thumb suggests that I should have at least 130 observations for my full
model. Although I violate this rule of thumb, it is the norm14 within the
development literature. In an attempt to yield more observations, I created a
dataset to analyze the 2007-2012 time period. However, I do not perform
statistical tests with this dataset since it only contains a few more observations,
has greater skewness, and constitutes a relatively short time period.
In order to avoid the problem of endogneity, all of the independent
variables are taken as close to 2002 as possible. Since many of the explanatory
variables both influence growth and are influenced by growth, reverse causation
may plague the results if independent variables are taken after the initial period.
For example, corruption may decrease growth, but a growing economy may
decrease corruption by increasing the returns to the productive sector. Taking
observations of independent variables from 2002 and using mean GDP per Capita
growth from 2002-2012 as the dependent variable avoids the problem of reverse

each variable on the dependent variable. However, since Mo (2001) has a similar bivariate
correlation and keeps both variables in the model, I do as well.
12
The majority of the literature employs GDP per Capita growth; however, since Mo (2001) and
Brempong (2002) use GDP growth as a dependent variable, I also compiled a dataset with GDP
growth. However, since skewness for GDP growth is 3.885 while skewness for GDP per Capita
growth is 3.615, I only use GDP per Capita growth when performing the statistical tests.
13
Since some of the growth rates are negative and logging a negative number is a mathematical
impossibility, I follow the same procedure as Brempong and Camacho (2006) and add 6 before
logging. 6 is used since the United Arab Emirates had a negative average growth rate of 5.6%, the
most negative growth rate of all countries.
14
For example, Mo (2001) has a model with 9 variables and 45 observations and Gupta et al.
(2002) have a model with 11 variables and only 37 observations.
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causation. It reveals the impact that initial levels of the independent variables
have on subsequent economic growth.
The two key independent variables under consideration are corruption and
income inequality. Both variables, however, have data limitations. Corruption is
inherently difficult to measure since most corrupt acts are illegal (Jain 2001).
Thus, I rely on perception of corruption rather than an objective measure. Using
the perception of corruption could pose a validity problem if perceptions differ
from reality. However, due to the difficulty in objectively measuring corruption,
using perceptions is the norm within the corruption literature. Transparency
International combines the results of numerous surveys to build an index for how
corrupt people perceive their government to be. A score of 10 indicates no
corruption while a score of 0 indicates complete corruption. In order to make
interpretation more natural, I follow the same procedure as Wei (2000) and Li et
al. (2000) by taking 10 minus the Corruption Perception Index. Thus, a higher
score now represents a higher level of corruption.
For income inequality, I use the Gini coefficient taken from the World
Bank. The Gini index ranges from 0 to 100 with a score of 0 representing perfect
equality and 100 representing perfect inequality. Since there is a high cost of
administering enough surveys to compile the Gini coefficient, data are not
available each year for every country in the sample. Only 49 countries have a
Gini index for 2002, but I am able to expand to 88 cases by including Gini data
from 2000 and 2001. Besides the quantity of Gini coefficients available, another
concern is quality. It is important for the data to be representative of the country
as a whole. Therefore, I drop all cases where the index is compiled from urban or
rural residents only15. Additionally, surveys in some countries are expenditurebased while others are income-based. Due to consumption smoothing, a person’s
expenditure varies less over their lifetime than their income (Deininger and Squire
1996).
Thus, using expenditure-based data would understate inequality.
Deininger and Squire (1996) find that, on average, expenditure-based coefficients
are 6.6 points less than income-based coefficients. I follow the procedure
developed by Deininger and Squire (1996) and used in Li and Zou (1998), Forbes
(2000), Keefer and Knack (2002), and Banerjee and Duflo (2003) and add 6.6 to
all expenditure-based coefficients.
Initial level of GDP per Capita is a critical control variable used
throughout the literature. Initial level of GDP per Capita is theorized to be
negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth. In the neoclassical
growth model, since capital deepening faces diminishing returns, convergence
occurs (all else equal) as poor countries “catch up” to rich countries over time
(Solow 1956). In the literature surveyed, the initial level of GDP per Capita is
15

For example, Argentina is dropped from the sample because the index is compiled only from
surveys given to urban residents.
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consistently negatively correlated with subsequent economic growth. However,
with the exception of Alesina and Rodrik (1994), the variable is always logged.
Since the skewness for initial GDP per Capita in my sample is 5.9, I also logged
it.
Investment is theorized to increase economic growth because investment
increases capital accumulation and thus productivity. Levine and Renelt (1992)
perform sensitivity analysis to show that investment is one of the few variables in
the development literature that remains statistically significant across different
time periods, specifications, and models. Although a variety of variables have
been used to proxy investment, I use gross domestic investment as a percentage of
GDP.
Trade is one of the oldest variables theorized to promote growth. Adam
Smith argued that trade with other nations allows for greater specialization as the
market expands. This greater specialization fosters economies of scale and higher
productivity. David Ricardo established a theory of trade based on comparative
advantage where trade allows countries to consume more than they could under a
condition of autarky. Trade is especially important to the literature linking
income inequality with subsequent economic growth because trade is theorized16
to decrease inequality in poor countries but increase inequality in rich countries
(Barro 2000). Although different studies have used either exports, imports, or
exports plus imports as proxies for openness to trade, Levine and Renelt (1992)
find no difference between the three proxies17. Thus, I use the World Bank data
for imports as a percentage of GDP.
Although economists have identified the effects of population growth to
be ambiguous with respect to economic growth, it is still a widely used control
variable (Levine and Renelt 1992). On the one hand, a growing population can
make it more difficult to increase GDP per Capita since population growth
increases the denominator in the GDP per Capita equation. However, population
growth can serve as a proxy for growth in the labor force, and a growing labor
force may be more productive by taking advantage of economies of scale (Mo
2001). Despite its ambiguous effects on growth, population growth can still alter
the results of statistical tests relating inequality and growth. For example, using
fertility as a similar variable to population growth, Barro (2000) finds that income
inequality has no significant effect on subsequent economic growth, but omitting

16

This is a restatement of the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem (Stolper and Samuelson 1941).
However, this theorem has not been borne out by subsequent empirical tests.
17
This finding is expected since exports are simply the payments for imports (Lerner 1936).
According to the Lerner Symmetry Theorem, the value of imported goods equals the value of
exported goods.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015

11

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3

fertility yields a statistically significant negative relationship. Thus, I include
population growth18 as a control variable.
Size of government is theorized to negatively impact growth because a
larger government may crowd-out some of the growth-promoting effects of the
market. Even if the government spends efficiently, there is still the risk that
government growth-promoting policies may ultimately harm growth because of
distortionary taxes (Levine and Renelt 1992). Thus, I use general government
final consumption expenditure (percent of GDP) as a measure of the size of
government. This includes all government expenditures for goods and services.
Inflation is another classic variable in the development literature theorized
to harm growth. Inflation, regardless of how it is measured, has consistently been
shown to harm growth (Levine and Renelt 1992). Inflation may be especially
important in the literature examining the effects of inequality on subsequent
growth because inflation increases inequality (Li and Zou 2002). Thus, I use
inflation as measured by the annual growth rate of the GDP deflator. This
measure shows the rate of price change in the economy as a whole.
Just as greater human capital makes an individual worker more
productive, higher levels of human capital in a country as a whole, make the
country more productive (Mincer 1984). Human capital as the source of new
knowledge and technology can help shift the production function upward and
break through the steady state implied by the neoclassical growth model.
Although human capital development can occur outside of formal education
(Mincer 1984), different measures for a country’s level of education are common
proxies for human capital. Thus, I include primary school completion rate as a
proxy for human capital. Although this variable accounts for the quantity of
formal education, it cannot control for the quality of education. However, in the
regressions performed by Levine and Renelt (1992), variables for the quality of
education, such as literacy rates, yield similar results.
This study employs standard OLS multiple regression analysis expressed
in the following reduced-form theoretical model:
(1)

       







          

where  is the predicted average real GDP per Capita growth rate in country i , b
is a partial slope measuring the impact that each term has on  ,  is a measure of
corruption in country i,  is an income inequality measure,  represents current
levels of economic well-being,  is a set of indicators for the openness of an

18

Population growth is defined by the World Bank as the exponential rate of growth of midyear
population between two years.
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economy,  contains demographic control variables,  reflects governmentrelated variables, and  is an error term accounting for omitted variable bias.
The hypothesis that the relationship between initial income inequality and
subsequent economic growth is overstated because corruption decreases
subsequent economic growth and increases income inequality is difficult to test.
It requires careful selection and interpretation of different models. I start with a
model where there is a statistically significant negative relationship between
income inequality and subsequent growth. If inequality is no longer statistically
significant or its coefficient is greatly reduced after adding corruption to the
model, then I would tentatively support the hypothesis. If corruption is added and
inequality maintains its statistical significance and magnitude on its coefficient,
then the hypothesis would be rejected19.
In order to make comparisons with the existing literature, it is important to
make as few changes to previous regressions as possible. Ideally, this would
mean replicating the results of a previous income inequality study and then simply
adding corruption. Unfortunately, due to data limitations, I am unable to use the
same time period as previous studies. However, I am able to closely match the
variables used in both Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and Persson and Tabellini
(1994). My Model 7 matches Models 1, 9, and 10 for Alesina and Rodrik (1994)
except they do not log initial GDP per Capita, and they use primary school
attendance rates rather than completion rates. My Model 7 also matches Model
(i) for Persson and Tabellini (1994) except they use primary school attendance
rates rather than completion rates and the size of the middle quintile for inequality
instead of the Gini coefficient. Although these models constitute a different time
period than my Model 7, the signs on the coefficients are consistent.
The reduced-form theoretical model can be expanded into a fully
developed empirical model. Taking each of the variables described above and
inserting them in as separate terms yields the following equation for average GDP
per capita growth from 2002-2012 for country i:
(2)

           02        
   ! "#$%  &   ' (  ℮

19

This statistical procedure and interpretation is similar to that used in Perotti (1996). After
finding inequality to be statistically significant and negatively impacting growth, Perotti (1996)
analyzes urbanization as a possible omitted variable. Urbanization may increase both economic
growth and inequality. However, after adding in urbanization it is statistically insignificant and
the coefficient for inequality is unchanged. Thus, Perotti (1996) concludes that urbanization is not
an omitted variable.
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Where  is the mean GDP per capita growth for country i from 2002-2012,
COR is the modified Corruption Perception Index for 2002,  is the Gini
coefficient for years 2000, 2001, and 2002, 02 is the logged GDP per capita for
2002,  is gross domestic investment as a percentage of GDP in 2002,  
is imports as a percentage of GDP for 2002,  is the rate of growth of
midyear population between the years 2001 and 2002, "#$% is the primary
school completion rate for 2002,  is the general government final
consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP for 2002, ( is the annual
growth rate of the GDP deflator for 2002, and ℮ is an error term.
IV. Findings / Observations
Tables 2 and 3, listed below, detail the results of the different regression
models20. Ten separate models are included with the first model containing all the
variables, Model 7 matching the models in Alesina and Rodrik (1994) and
Persson and Tabellini (1994), and Model 8 adding corruption. I report
unstandardized and standardized coefficients (in parenthesis), significance levels,
r2 values, and, in the bottom row, the number of observations.
The
unstandardized coefficient21 is the partial slope of the regression plane. It gives
the amount of change in the dependent variable from a one-unit change in the
independent variable22, all else constant. The standardized coefficients make use
of a conversion to standard units, z-scores, and thus reflect the number of standard
deviations the dependent variable will change from a standard deviation change in
the independent variable. The r2 value in each model is the percentage of
variation in the dependent variable that can be explained by the variance in all the
independent variables found in each model.

20

Models 11-20 are in Appendix A and display the results with logged average GDP per Capita
growth 2002-2012 as the dependent variable. Despite the problem of skewness, the results are
similar to those in Models 1-10.
21
For example, in Model 1 an increase in the corruption index by a unit of 1 decreases the average
annual GDP per Capita growth rate by .167 percentage points, all else equal.
22
However, since initial GDP per Capita is logged, the simple conversion does not work for this
independent variable.
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Table 2: Models 1-5. Dependent Variable: Average GDP per Capita Growth
2002-2012
Variable
Model 1
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
Model 5
Corruption
Inequality
Logged Initial
GDP per Capita
Investment
Openness to
Trade

-.167
(-.156)
-.017
(-.063)
-3.272***
(-.915)
.164***
(.312)
.002
(.012)

Population
Growth
Government
Spending
Inflation Rate

-.214
(-.110)
.000
(.001)
-.022
(-.092)
.066***
(.535)

-.163
(-.173)

-.193
(-.199)

-3.193***
(-.976)
.148***
(.317)

-.025
(-.091)
-2.857***
(-.798)
.125***
(.251)

-3.245***
(-.967)
.138***
(.290)

-2.629***
(-.750)
.042
(.102)

-.339*
(-.179)

-.330
(-.168)

-.313
(-.162)

-.623***
(-.300)

-.011
(-.051)
.060***
(.492)

-.026
(-.103)
.050***
(.458)

.061
(.486)

.044***
(.404)

.591
72

.441
126

Primary
Completion
Rate
.663
.635
.594
R Square
55
71
65
Observations
Significance Measures:
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level)
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level)
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level)
Standardized partial coefficients are in parentheses
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Table 3: Models 6-10. Dependent Variable: Average GDP per Capita
Growth 2002-2012
Variable
Model 6
Model 7
Model 8
Model 9 Model 10
Corruption
Inequality
Logged Initial
GDP per Capita
Investment

-2.398***
(-.694)

-.056
(-.051)
-.064**
-.070**
(-.229)
(-.258)
-3.045*** -3.277***
(-.837)
(-.892)

-.078
(-.081)

-2.908***
(-.884)

-.052**
(-.185)
-2.828***
(-.772)
.117**
(.234)

.077***
(.623)

.057***
(.511)

.458
73

.552
66

Openness to
Trade
Population
Growth
Government
Spending
Inflation Rate

-.643***
(-.312)

.037***
.067***
.078***
Primary
(.345)
(.614)
(.616)
Completion
Rate
.385
.507
.552
R Square
134
68
56
Observations
Significance Measures:
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level)
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level)
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level)
Standardized partial coefficients are in parentheses

The results of this study contain some expected findings, some unexpected
findings, and a lack of support to confirm the hypothesis. As expected, level of
investment and primary completion rate are both positively and significantly
correlated with subsequent economic growth. Additionally, initial level of GDP
per Capita has a large negative correlation with subsequent growth and is
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level in every model. Population
growth consistently has a negative coefficient; however, it is only statistically
significant in roughly half the models.
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Surprisingly, openness to trade, inflation rate, and government spending
are never close to being statistically significant and have almost no effect on
subsequent growth. Perhaps openness to trade is influenced by the Great
Recession. Countries that are less interconnected may not have been influenced
as much by contractions in other countries. However, the empirical link between
openness to trade and susceptibility to external shocks is unclear. Easterly et al.
(2001) find that openness to trade is associated with increased volatility in per
capita growth rates while Cavallo and Frankel (2008) find that openness to trade
decreases a country’s chances of experiencing a recession due to external shocks.
Inflation may be a weak variable in my models because of the relatively
short time period of 10 years under consideration. In the short-run, inflation may
lower nominal interest rates. These lower interest rates may encourage
investments into asset bubbles such as real-estate and the stock market. The
economy appears to be growing in the short-run, and the negative effects of
inflation may occur outside of a 10-year time frame.
Level of government spending may be showing a neutral effect on
subsequent economic growth because the composition of government spending
may matter more than the magnitude. Governments may provide growthpromoting public goods, or they might spend money on redistribution programs
that harm growth (Levine and Renelt 1992). In some cases, government spending
and market activities may be complements. For example, government financed
infrastructure may promote growth by widening the extent of the market.
Additionally, the negative effects of a high level of government spending may
take longer than 10 years to develop. In the short-run, a government may be able
to avoid growth-retarding tax increases by financing part of its spending through
borrowing. The negative side-effects of borrowing may occur outside of a 10year time horizon.
Corruption enters in with the expected sign in every model, but it is never
statistically significant. However, its magnitude is fairly large in some models.
For example, in Model 4, a 1 unit change in the corruption index is associated
with a .193 percentage point decrease in annual GDP per Capita growth. To put
this into perspective, if Bangladesh (the most corrupt country in the sample) were
to reduce its corruption to the level in Finland (the least corrupt country), the
model indicates that Bangladesh would increase its growth rate by 1.64
percentage points23 (all else equal). Corruption also appears to have a nontrivial
impact on the explanatory power of the models; removing corruption between
Models 4 and 5 reduces the R Square from .591 to .441. Therefore, the findings
23

The increase in the growth rate by 1.64 percentage points may appear small, but small
differences in growth rates have a large impact in the long-run. For example, a country growing at
1% per year doubles every 70 years, but a country growing at 2.64% each year doubles every 43
years.
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suggest that corruption has a sizable negative impact on growth, but this effect is
not statistically significant.
There are a few possible reasons for this finding that relate to the quality
of the corruption data. There is the possibility of a validity problem as the
perception of corruption and the actual level of corruption may differ in some
important way. For example, cultural norms in Africa may make the perception
of corruption different than in other regions (Brempong 2002). Additionally,
different types of corruption are not revealed by people’s perception of
corruption. Decentralized forms of corruption may be more harmful than
centralized forms (Brempong and Camacho 2006). If there is no coordination
between different public officials demanding bribes throughout a lengthy process
such as securing a deed to property, then no individual public official can be held
accountable for the success or failure of securing the deed. However, in a
centralized system, public officials accepting a bribe can be held accountable.
Thus, they will be more likely to ensure that the service is provided quickly
(Brempong and Camacho 2006).
Income inequality has a negative coefficient across all models, but this
effect is only statistically significant in the simplified models. The impact of
inequality on subsequent growth is fairly large in the models where it is
statistically significant. For example, in Model 7, increasing a country’s Gini
coefficient by a unit of 1, decreases subsequent growth by .064 percentage points
each year. To put this into perspective, if Angola (the least equal country)
reduced its inequality to the level of Sweden (the most equal country), the model
indicates that Angola would increase its growth rate by 2.35 percentage points (all
else equal).
The theory under consideration is that the negative relationship between
initial levels of income inequality and subsequent growth is partly spurious
because corruption decreases growth and increases inequality. However, there is
no evidence from the statistical tests that this theory is valid. In Model 7,
inequality has an unstandardized coefficient of -.064, standardized coefficient of .229, and is statistically significant at the 95% confidence level. After adding
corruption in with Model 8, the confidence level for inequality remains the same
and the magnitude of the relationship actually increases slightly with an
unstandardized coefficient of -.070 and standardized coefficient of -.258 for
inequality. This is the exact opposite effect than what the theory would suggest24.
Additionally, corruption is not statistically significant. These models suggest that
inequality negatively impacts growth even after controlling for corruption.

24

The same result can be observed in Appendix A with Models 17 and 18.
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V. Conclusions
Using standard OLS multiple regression analysis, this study confirms the
relationship between several factors and subsequent growth. However, this study
does not find support for the theory that the relationship between inequality and
subsequent growth is partly spurious due to corruption as an intervening variable.
In fact, the observed effect of corruption on inequality is opposite of what the
theory would suggest. Even though the hypothesis is rejected, this study still adds
to the literature by eliminating a possible intervening variable in the relationship
between inequality and growth. Additionally, it confirms the relationship
between initial levels of GDP per Capita, investment, and level of human capital
in a shorter and more recent time period than most studies.
This study, however, suffers from numerous weaknesses. Given the
number of observations available, most models include more variables than are
appropriate in multiple regression analysis. Additionally, the variables included
do not fully match the variables included in the previous studies that I try to
replicate. This study also differs from these prior studies because it uses a shorter
and more recent time period. With a longer time period, the effect of inequality
on growth may be different (Banerjee and Duflo 2003). Additionally, the key
explanatory variable in my theory, corruption, is based on perceptions and is
never statistically significant.
Due to the limitations of this study and the difficulties of empirical work
in development economics as a whole, policy recommendations must be made
cautiously. Just because a variable is shown to impact growth in a model does not
mean that increasing or decreasing the variable makes for good public policy. For
example, the initial level of GDP per Capita has a highly statistically significant
negative relationship with subsequent economic growth. However, a growth
policy advocating for an initial reduction in GDP in order to increase subsequent
growth would be an absurd and self-defeating policy.
Even though this study finds a negative relationship between inequality
and growth, the best policy for growth may not be redistribution. In the literature,
some studies recommend redistribution on efficiency grounds (Aghion et al.
1999; Keefer and Knack 2002), but the majority of researchers recognize the
adverse effects that redistribution can have on incentives. Although the results of
the statistical tests suggest that there is no trade-off between equity and efficiency,
the costs of redistribution may still exceed the benefits of a more equal society.
Although corruption is never statistically significant in any model, the size
of its negative effects is substantial. Thus, policies that reduce corruption may
encourage growth. However, the optimum level of corruption is not zero since
there are costs associated with reducing corruption. The optimal level of
corruption occurs where the marginal social costs of reducing corruption further
equal the marginal social benefits of that reduction (Tanzi 1998). Since

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015

19

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3

reductions in corruption are subject to diminishing returns (Brempong and
Camacho 2006), countries that are highly corrupt may benefit from a development
strategy focused on reducing corruption while countries that have little corruption
would likely not benefit as much from a similar strategy.
The relationship between primary completion rate and subsequent
economic growth is positive and highly statistically significant in almost every
model. However, this does not mean that a simple public policy such as
increasing government spending on primary education would automatically foster
growth. For example, Levine and Renelt (1992) find that enrollment rates are
positively and significantly correlated with subsequent growth, but government
education expenditures are not. This finding suggests that the quality and
quantity of education are not wholly dependent on the level of education
spending. Additionally, since there are decreasing returns to education (Aghion et
al. 1999), countries with different initial levels of education may yield different
results from a policy encouraging more education. It is also important to keep in
mind that primary completion rates are serving as a proxy for human capital, and
there are avenues to increase human capital outside of education.
Even though my models show little relationship between openness to
trade, the inflation rate, and subsequent growth, it does not necessarily mean these
factors are unimportant. Due to the challenges of empirical analysis in
development economics, the significance of variables can be sensitive to different
control variables, specification, statistical technique, and time period. It is not
possible to perfectly determine what causes growth. Therefore, it is especially
important from a public policy perspective to ascertain what variables have an
important role (significant across many studies) and what variables have little role
(rarely significant) (Durlauf et al. 2005). Since economic growth is brought about
by a complicated interaction of numerous variables, there is no single correct
solution for achieving faster growth.
Given the complexity of the factors influencing economic growth, there
are several avenues for subsequent research. Data limitations have been a major
concern in prior studies as well as in this one. Subsequent research would be
aided by larger data sets that are already standardized. This would also better
allow researchers to replicate findings before testing a new theory since results
can vary if models differ in time period and specification of variables (Levine and
Renelt 1992). In the inequality literature, there is consistently a negative
relationship between inequality and subsequent growth. However, the avenues
through which inequality harms growth have been largely untested. Additionally,
when some of the avenues, such as the demand for more redistribution, have been
empirically tested, they are not borne out by the data (Perotti 1996). Future
research should go beyond establishing a negative relationship between inequality
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and subsequent growth and test the channels through which inequality may harm
growth.
Given that few of the channels have been tested empirically, it is also
important for future work to continue to test the validity of the relationship
between inequality and growth. It is especially important to test for omitted
variables that may reveal the relationship to be spurious. For example, lack of
property rights and a stable rule of law decrease economic growth by making
capital dead and increase inequality by restricting the poor’s access to legal
institutions (De Soto 2003). Thus, it may not really be income inequality that
harms growth, but lack of property rights and a stable rule of law that decrease
growth and increase inequality25. However, there could be other variables that
may strengthen the negative effect of inequality on growth. For example, if labor
market flexibility is positively correlated with growth and positively correlated
with inequality, then controlling for labor market flexibility may increase the
coefficient for inequality.
This study does not find support for the hypothesis that the relationship
between inequality and subsequent growth is partly spurious due to corruption as
an intervening variable. The observed effect of corruption on inequality is
opposite of what the hypothesis would suggest. Additionally, some factors
theorized to influence growth such as inflation, openness to trade, and size of
government have little impact. However, this study does confirm several factors
such as initial level of GDP per Capita, investment level, and primary completion
rates as being important for growth. The results of this study suggest that,
although one of the oldest questions in economics, what causes growth is still
partly unknown and likely will not ever be fully understood.

25

Evidence for this effect may already exist. After adding a property rights index, Keefer and
Knack (2002) find that the coefficient for income inequality is halved and no longer statistically
significant. Additionally, the property rights index is statistically significant at the 95%
confidence level and the R Square almost doubles. Keefer and Knack (2002) see this finding as a
confirmation of their theory that inequality reduces growth mainly by harming property rights.
However, they never test the direction of the relationship. I attempted to replicate the results of
this study testing first with the overall score for the Economic Freedom Index in 2002 and then
with the subcomponent for property rights. However, both variables behave like the corruption
variable as they are statistically insignificant and have no discernable effect on the income
inequality variable.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015

21

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3

References
Aghion, P., Caroli, E., & Garcia-Penalosa, C. (1999). Inequality and economic
growth: The perspective of the new growth theories. Journal of Economic
Literature, 37(4), 1615-1660.
Alesina, A., & Rodrik, D. (1994). Distributive politics and economic growth. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109(2), 465-490.
Banerjee, A., & Duflo, E. (2003). Inequality and growth: What can the data say?
Journal of Economic Growth, 8(3), 267-299.
Barro, R. (2000). Inequality and growth in a panel of countries. Journal of
Economic Growth, 5, 5-32.
Benabou, R. (1996). Inequality and growth. NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 11,
11-92.
Berg, A., Ostry, J., & Zettelmeyer, J. (2012). What makes growth sustained?
Journal of Development Economics, 98, 149-166.
Brempong, K. (2002). Corruption, economic growth, and income inequality in
Africa. Economics of Governance, 3, 183-209.
Brempong, K., & Camacho, S. (2006). Corruption, growth, and income
distribution: Are there regional differences? Economics of Governance, 7,
245-269.
Cavallo, E. A., & Frankel, J. A. (2008). Does openness to trade make countries
more vulnerable to sudden stops, or less? Using gravity to establish
causality. Journal of International Money and Finance, 27(8), 1430-1452.
De Soto, H. (2003). Mystery of capital: Why capitalism triumphs in the West and
fails everywhere else. Basic books.
Deininger, K., & Squire, L. (1996). A new data set measuring income inequality.
The World Bank Economic Review, 10(3), 565-591.
Durlauf, S., Johnson, P., & Temple, J. (2005). Growth econometrics. Handbook of
Economic Growth, 1, 555-677.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol11/iss1/3

22

Matti: Corruption, Income Inequality, and Subsequent Economic Growth

Easterly, W., Islam, R., & Stiglitz, J. E. (2001). Shaken and stirred: Explaining
growth volatility. In Annual World Bank conference on development
economics (Vol. 2000, pp. 191-211).
Easterly, W., Ritzen, J., & Woolcock, M. (2006). Social cohesion, institutions,
and growth. Economics & Politics, 18(2), 103-120.
Forbes, K. (2000). A reassessment of the relationship between inequality and
growth. The American Economic Review, 90(4), 869-887.
Gupta, S., Davoodi, H., & Alonso-Terme, R. (2002). Does corruption affect
income inequality and poverty? Economics of Governance, 3(1), 23-45.
Jain, A. (2001). Corruption: A review. Journal of Economic Surveys, 15(1), 71121.
Keefer, P., & Knack, S. (2002). Polarization, politics and property rights: Links
between inequality and growth. Public Choice, 111, 127-154.
Kuznets, S. (1955). Economic growth and income inequality. The American
Economic Review, 45(1), 1-28.
Lerner, A. P. (1936). The symmetry between import and export taxes. Economica,
3(11), 306-313.
Levine, R., & Renelt, D. (1992). A sensitivity analysis of cross-country growth
regressions. The American Economic Review, 82(4), 942-963.
Li, H., Xu, L. C., & Zou, H. (2000). Corruption, income distribution, and growth.
Economics and Politics, 12(2), 155-181.
Li, H., & Zou, H. (2002). Inflation, growth, and income distribution: A crosscountry study. Annals of Economics and Finance, 3, 85-101.
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics,
110(3), 681-712.
Mauro, P. (1997). The effects of corruption on growth, investment and
government expenditure: A cross country analysis. Washington DC:
Institute for International Economics.

Published by Digital Commons @ IWU, 2015

23

Undergraduate Economic Review, Vol. 11 [2015], Iss. 1, Art. 3

Mincer, J. (1984). Human capital and economic growth. Economics of Education
Review, 3(3), 195-205.
Mo, P. H. (2001). Corruption and economic growth. Journal of Comparative
Economics, 29, 66-79.
Murphy, K., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. (1993). Why is rent-seeking so costly to
growth? The American Economic Review, 83(2), 409.
Okun, A. M. (1975). Equality and efficiency: The big tradeoff. Brookings
Institution Press.
Perotti, R. (1996). Growth, income distribution, and democracy: What the data
say. Journal of Economic Growth, 1(2), 149-187.
Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1994). Is inequality harmful for growth? Theory and
evidence, American Economic Review, 84(3), 600-21
Rodrik, D. (1999). Where did all the growth go? External shocks, social conflict,
and growth collapses. Journal of Economic Growth, 4(4), 385-412.
Sachs, J. D. (1989). Social conflict and populist policies in Latin America (No.
2897). National Bureau of Economic Research.
Solow, R. (1956). A Contribution to the theory of economic growth. The
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70(1), 65-94.
Smith, A. (1863). An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations.
A. and C. Black.
Stolper, W. F., & Samuelson, P. A. (1941). Protection and real wages. The Review
of Economic Studies, 9(1), 58-73.
Tabachnick, B. G., & Fidell, L. S. (2001). Chapter 5. Using Multivariate Statistics
(4th ed., pp. 116-117). Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.
Tanzi, V. (1998). Corruption around the world: Causes, consequences, scope, and
cures. IMF Staff Papers, 45(4), 559-594.
Wei, S. (2000). How taxing is corruption on international investors? Review of
Economics and Statistics, 52(1), 1-11.

https://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/uer/vol11/iss1/3

24

Matti: Corruption, Income Inequality, and Subsequent Economic Growth

Appendix A: Models with the Alternative Dependent Variable
Table 4: Models 11-15. Dependent Variable: Logged Average GDP per Capita
Growth 2002-2012

Variable

Model 11

Model 12

Corruption

-.004
(-.168)
.000
(-.053)
-.074***
(-.961)
.003**
(.286)
.000
(.019)

-.004
(-.175)

Inequality
Logged Initial
GDP per Capita
Investment
Openness to
Trade
Population
Growth
Government
Spending
Inflation Rate

-.072***
(-1.006)
.003***
(.297)

Model 13

Model 15

-.004
(-.204)
-.001
(-.088)
-.064***
(-.827)
.002**
(.230)

-.005
-.008*
-.007
(-.126)
(-.187)
(-.173)
.000
(.012)
-.001
.000
-.001
(-.103)
(-.060)
(-.114)
Primary
.001***
.001***
.001***
Completion Rate
(.553)
(.507)
(.483)
.682
.648
.610
R Square
55
71
65
Observations
Significance Measures:
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level)
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level)
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level)
Standardized partial coefficients are in parentheses
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Model 14

-.073***
(-.989)
.003***
(.267)

-.059***
(-.735)
.001*
(.115)

-.007
(-.166)

-.015***
(-.320)

.001***
(.496)
.595
72

.001***
(.381)
.437
126
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Table 5: Models 16-18. Dependent Variable: Logged Average GDP per Capita
Growth 2002-2012

Variable

Model 16

Model 17

Model 18

Model 19
-.002
(-.090)

-.001**
(-.226)
-.068***
(-.854)

-.002
(-.073)
-.001**
(-.252)
-.074***
(-.927)

-.066***
(-.907)

-.001**
(-.187)
-.064***
(-.794)
.002**
(.208)

.001***
(.626)
.525
68

.002***
(.631)
.574
56

.002***
(.633)
.475
73

.001***
(.532)
.560
66

Corruption
Inequality
Logged Initial
GDP per Capita
Investment

-.054***
(-.679)

Model 20

Openness to
Trade
Population
Growth
Government
Consumption
(percentage of
GDP)
Inflation Rate

-.016***
(-.330)

Primary
Completion Rate
R Square
Observations

.001***
(.324)
.381
134

Significance Measures:
• *p < .10 (90% confidence level)
• **p < .05 (95% confidence level)
• ***p < .01 (99% confidence level)
Standardized partial coefficients are in parentheses
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